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KEYSTONE BITUMINOUS COAL, FIRST
ENGLISH AND NOLLAN: A FRAMEWORK
FOR ACCOMMODATION?
PETER W. SALSICH, JR. *
I. INTRODUCTION
In its 1986-87 term, the Supreme Court produced the most impor-
tant developments for land use law since the mid-1920s. In a series of
landmark decisions, the Supreme Court redefined private property
rights in the context of the highly complex, resource-sensitive society
of the approaching twenty-first century.
Three dominant themes run through these cases: 1) a refinement of
the concept that societal complexities surrounding a particular land
parcel limit private property rights; 2) a recognition that the costs of
protecting land from exploitation by its private owners may not be im-
posed solely on the private owners without violation of the fifth amend-
ment; and 3) an implied rejection of the traditional approach of
allowing a group of inexpert citizens to make technical decisions re-
garding appropriate use of private property.
In its most significant decision, First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,' the Court ruled that if a
government regulation either temporarily or permanently deprives a
landowner of substantial use and enjoyment of his land, the fifth
amendment requires that the government pay the owner just compen-
sation.' Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. De Benedictis,3 an
* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.
1. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
2. Id
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earlier decision of the same term, establishes a frame of reference for
evaluating First English. Keystone involved a challenge to a state stat-
ute regulating the mining of coal, which required landowners to leave
in place fifty percent of the coal located under certain structures. The
state imposed this restriction to prevent land subsidence. The Court
held the statute did not constitute a taking because the state enacted it
for a substantial public purpose, and the statute failed to deprive the
property owner of all use of his land.
In the third decision, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,4 the
Court refused to defer to the California Coastal Commission's determi-
nation of the proper means to accomplish a public purpose. The state
commission imposed a public access easement on private beachfront
property as a condition to the landowner's receipt of a construction
permit for a residence on that property. The Court held the Commis-
sion's conditional permit granting scheme invalid unless the state com-
pensated the owner for the easement.
The Court heard three other property rights cases in the 1987 term.5
In United States v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma,6 the Court reaf-
firmed the rule that government regulation of navigable waters is not
an unconstitutional taking of property from the riparian owners who
use the stream bed. The Court's rationale was that the property rights
of the riparian owners are subject to the "dominant servitude" of the
government.
In California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock Company7 the
Court distinguished between land use planning and environmental reg-
ulation. The Court ruled that federal land use planning statutes and
regulations applicable to federal lands do not preempt state environ-
mental regulation of private mining activity on national forest land. In
Hodel v. Irving8 the Court unanimously held that a statute that re-
quired small, unproductive land interests owned by individual native
3. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
4. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
5. The Court signaled a desire to continue to explore property rights in land by
accepting Pennell v. City of San Jose, 107 S. Ct. 1346 (1987). However, the Court
declined to decide the issue whether a rent control ordinance that establishes permissi-
ble rent levels based on low income tenants' ability to pay constitutes a taking of prop-
erty because the question was premature since the ordinance had never been applied.
Pennel v. City of San Jose, 108 S. Ct. 849, 856-57 (1988).
6. 107 S. Ct. 1487 (1987).
7. 107 S. Ct. 1419 (1987).
8. 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987).
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Americans to escheat to the owner's tribe, rather than descend by in-
testacy or devise, constituted an unconstitutional taking of property.
Although the statute's purpose of encouraging consolidation of divided
unproductive land interests may have been legitimate, the Court found
that the government's abolishment of the right to transfer by both de-
scent and devise went "too far." 9
What are the implications of these developments for landowners and
regulators? Early returns indicate that First English has significant im-
plications for local government planning and budgetary processes. The
full impact of the decision, however, will remain unknown until state
and local governments face several unanswered questions. The time is
ripe for land users, developers, and regulators to attempt to restructure
the land use regulation process to accommodate more effectively their
respective interests.
Although cities may worry about the impact of First English and
Nollan on their ability to plan and effectively control development,
they are not alone. Landowners and developers have also become in-
creasingly concerned that Keystone and its progeny represent judicial
approval of a legislative tendency to shift a disproportionate share of
the social cost of regulating land use to private landowners.1" When
the three cases are read together, what emerges is a sense that both
landowners and regulators have important common interests which the
American property law system can accommodate.
II. THE KEYSTONE CASE
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. De Benedictis'1 a sharply
divided Court upheld the Pennsylvania Bituminous Mine Subsidence
and Land Conservation Act 12 (hereinafter "the Act"), which imposes
stringent regulations on the mining of coal in areas subject to subsi-
dence. Section 4 of the Act prohibits mining that causes subsidence
damage to public buildings, residences, and cemeteries. 3 The Act's
9. Id. at 2084-85. In the course of several concurring opinions in Hodel, six justices
split on whether the decision expanded or limited an earlier decision that upheld a pro-
hibition of the right to sell parts of endangered eagles as necessary to an environmental
protection regulatory scheme. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
10. See Wall St. J., March 10, 1987, at 12, col. 2 (editorializing that the Keystone
decision amounted to "expropriation declared legal").
11. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
12. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1406.1 et seq. (Purdon Supp. 1986).
13. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1406.4 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
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implementing regulations generally require that landowners leave in
place fifty percent of the coal under such structures to prevent subsi-
dence. 4 Section 6 of the Act authorizes the Pennsylvania Department
of Environmental Regulation to revoke a mining permit if coal removal
causes damage to a protected structure or area and the landowner fails
to take satisfactory steps to repair damage and satisfy resulting
claims.' 5
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, rejected the coal associa-
tion's argument that Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon 16 should control.
Relying on Pennsylvania Coal, the association contended that the state
regulations amounted to an unconstitutional taking of that percentage
of coal the Act prohibited landowners from mining. 7 Justice Stevens
distinguished Pennsylvania Coal because the Act in Keystone asserted
genuine, substantial, and legitimate public purposes associated with
health and safety, while the Kohler Act18 construed in Pennsylvania
Coal was essentially a private benefit statute. 9 In addition, although
the Kohler Act made mining of "certain coal" commercially impracti-
cable, the Act in Keystone did not deny the coal mine operators' eco-
nomically viable use of their property "as a whole."20 The key factor
in Justice Stevens' analysis was the determination that the property in-
terest "as a whole" formed the basis for a taking evaluation, rather
than the consideration of any particular "strand of the bundle."'"
Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, carefully laid the foundation for
his majority opinion in First English. First, he disagreed sharply with
the majority's characterization of Justice Holmes' opinion in Penn-
sylvania Coal as "uncharacteristically... advisory." Additionally, the
Chief Justice renounced the majority's conclusion that the Kohler Act
served only private interests. Rather, according to Justice Rehnquist,
the Court in Pennsylvania Coal recognized that although the Kohler
14. 25 PA. CODE § 89.143(b).
15. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1406.6 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
16. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
17. The amount of coal involved was large in quantity, 27 million tons, but small in
relation to the total amount owned, only 2%. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De
Benedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1248 (1987).
18. Act of May 27, 1921, 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 661-671 (Purdon 1966).
19. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1242.
20. Id at 1246-48.
21. Id. at 1248 (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) and Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978)).
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Act served public interests, the "mere existence of a public purpose was
insufficient to release the government from the compensation require-
ment."22 In fact, a public purpose was "merely a necessary prerequi-
site" to the exercise of the taking power.2 3 Although the nature of the
public purpose may be important because of the nuisance exception to
takings law which permits the government to prevent private landown-
ers from injuring others without paying compensation,24 the statute in
Keystone did not fall within the nuisance exception, which has been
narrowly tailored to allow government to prevent "a misuse or illegal
use."
25
In confining the nuisance exception to discrete and narrow purposes,
the Court has refrained from applying it so as to allow complete extinc-
tion of the value of a parcel of property. 6 Viewing both the support
estate and the right to mine coal as distinct property rights under
Pennsylvania law,2 the Chief Justice considered the twenty-seven mil-
lion tons of coal required by the Subsidence Act to be left in the ground
as an identifiable property interest. Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded
that the governmental action destroyed completely "any interest in a
segment of property," rather than only "one strand in the bundle," as
effectively as if the government had taken possession of the land2 or
mined the coal.2 9
III. THE FIRST ENGLISH CASE
In returning to the same themes three months later, Chief Justice
Rehnquist found himself in the majority in the landmark First English
decision. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.
County of Los Angeles3" involved a challenge to a Los Angeles County
ordinance which prohibited the construction of buildings in the flood
plain of Mill Creek.3" The County enacted this ordinance after a disas-
22. 107 S. Ct. at 1253-55.
23. Id. at 1256, (citing Hawaii Housing v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-43, 245
(1984)); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954).
24. 107 S. Ct. at 1256.
25. Id.
26. Id at 1257.
27. Id. at 1259-61.
28. Id at 1258 (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946)).
29. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1259.
30. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
31. Idl at 2381-82.
19881
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trous flood destroyed a campground owned and operated by the First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church.3 2
Initially, the Court dispensed with a series of procedural questions
that had stalled the Court on four previous occasions33 by concluding
that the lower courts' summary dismissal of a damages claim for regu-
latory deprivation of all use of a campground "isolates the remedial
question for our consideration." 34 The Court held the California
courts' conclusion that the only remedy for excessive regulation was
through declaratory judgment or mandamus declarations of invalid-
ity35 inconsistent with the fifth amendment.3 6
Chief Justice Rehnquist focused on the language of the fifth amend-
ment, noting that Congress designed it not to limit governmental inter-
ference with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation
in the event of an otherwise proper interference amounting to a tak-
ing.37 The constitutional right to compensation is self-executing, re-
quiring no formal eminent domain proceedings to trigger its
protection.38 Recognizing that a temporary taking results from a regu-
lation subsequently declared invalid, the Chief Justice stated that the
California Supreme Court's rule limiting a landowner's remedy to a
declaration of invalidity has "truncated" the fifth amendment's re-
quirement of compensation. Responding to the California courts' de-
sire to preserve the necessary flexibility of local land use planning and
to avoid the "inhibiting financial force" of a compensation rule, Chief
Justice Rehnquist implied that despite these considerations, the state
must pay just compensation for the temporary taking caused by a regu-
lation later declared invalid. 39
32. Id.
33. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986); William-
son County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); San
Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255 (1980).
34. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2384.
35. See, eg., Agins v. Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 275-77, 598 P.2d 25, 29-31 (1979),
aff'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
36. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2383.
37. Id at 2386. The Court failed to address whether the ordinance in question
actually amounted to a regulatory taking by denying all use of the property. Addition-
ally, the Court expressed no opinion on whether the county government could avoid a
compensable taking by characterizing the ordinance as a safety regulation within the
"nuisance exception" discussed in Keystone. Id at 2384-85.
38. Id. at 2386.
39. Id at 2387.
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The Chief Justice noted that a government can continue to impose a
regulation that effects a taking by choosing to pay compensation.
Therefore, he reasoned, cases that require the government to pay com-
pensation for temporary takings such as wartime appropriations of
property or condemnation of leasehold interests "reflect the fact that
'temporary' takings which, as here, deny a landowner all use of his
property, are not different in kind from permanent takings, for which
the Constitution clearly requires compensation."' 4 Chief Justice Rehn-
quist commented that courts have required the federal government to
pay compensation for the taking of leasehold interests of a shorter du-
ration than the six and one-half years the regulation in First English
denied the church use of its campground. Chief Justice Rehnquist
stated:
The value of a leasehold interest in property for a period of years
may be substantial, and the burden on the property owner in ex-
tinguishing such an interest for a period of years may be great
indeed.... Where this burden results from governmental action
that amounted to a taking, the Just Compensation Clause of the
Fifth Amendment requires that the government pay the land-
owner for the value of the use of the land during this period....
Invalidation of the ordinance or its successor ordinance after this
period of time, though converting the taking into a "temporary"
one, is not a sufficient remedy to meet the demands of the Just
Compensation Clause.41
The Court distinguished prior decisions which held that mere dimi-
nution in value from an action by the government prior to the actual
taking is not compensable. These cases simply reaffirm the rule that
courts should determine valuation for compensation purposes on the
date of the taking.42
The Court declined to require that a government which had engaged
in a regulatory taking must exercise the power of eminent domain at
the behest of the property owner.43 The Court limited its decision to
temporary takings, refusing to consider questions arising from normal
40. Id. at 2388.
41. Id
42. Id
43. Id at 2389. The Solicitor General made this suggestion to the Court: "We
merely hold that where the government's activities have already worked a taking of all
use of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to
provide compensation for the period during which the taking was effective." Id
1988]
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procedural delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning or-
dinances, and the like.
Justice Stevens, who wrote for the majority in Keystone, passionately
dissented in First English. Justice Stevens characterized the Court's
decision in First English as a "loose cannon" that would set off an ex-
plosion of unproductive litigation.' He advanced four arguments.
Justices Blackmun and O'Connor supported two of Justice Stevens'
procedural arguments.45 Justice Stevens based a third argument on the
Court's analysis of precedent in the regulatory takings area.4 6 In his
most crucial substantive point, Justice Stevens argued that the due pro-
cess clause, rather than the takings clause, is the "primary constraint
on the use of unfair and dilatory procedures in the land-use area."
47
In his dissent, Justice Stevens reasserted his position in Keystone that
a property owner impliedly accepts governmental regulation of his land
use when necessary to prevent injury to the community.48 He argued
that regulatory takings differ from physical takings only because a reg-
ulatory taking involves no physical invasion. Although virtually all
physical invasions amount to a taking, only the most severe regulations
constitute takings, despite their effects on property use and value.4 9
Justice Stevens suggested that regulations be analyzed from a three di-
mensional perspective, with their depth, width, and length correspond-
ing to the extent to which the regulation deprives the owner of the use
of the property, the amount of property affected, and the duration of
the restrictions, respectively.50 This analysis made Justice Stevens
question the distinction between regulatory and physical takings.5"
44. Id at 2400.
45. The procedural arguments were that the Court "unnecessarily and imprudently
assumes" that the complaint alleged a constitutional taking, and that the Court "incor-
rectly assumes" that the California Supreme Court has decided that it would never
approve a compensation remedy for a regulatory taking. Id. at 2390-93, 2396-98.
46. Id at 2393-96.
47. Id at 2390, 2398-2400.
48. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De Benedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1245 (1987)
(quoting Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887)).
49. Id at 2393.
50. Id at 2395.
51. Justice Stevens stated:
Why should there be a constitutional distinction between a permanent restriction
that only reduces the economic value of the property by a fraction-perhaps one
third-[no taking recognized] and a restriction that merely postpones the develop-
ment of the property for a fraction of its useful life-presumably far less than a
third [a taking under the rule of First English]?
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Justice Stevens also criticized the majority for failing to explain why
courts should treat differently the normal delays in the land use control
process, which totally deny the desired use of the land, from the denial
of use that occurs when landowners challenge regulations in court.52
Furthermore, Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority's conclusion
that the California courts have decided that a landowner burdened by
excessive regulations is foreclosed from obtaining a damages remedy.53
Although he was at his rhetorical best in the final part of his dissent,
Justice Stevens gathered no visible support from the other justices. In
this section, he argued that the due process clause, rather than the tak-
ings clause, protects and redresses landowners victimized by "improp-
erly motivated, unfairly conducted, or unnecessarily protracted
governmental decision making." 4 By resorting to section 1983 litiga-
tion in federal court, aggrieved landowners can obtain damages for
procedural due process violations.55 Justice Stevens, however, re-
mained unpersuaded that landowners should receive damages under
the takings clause to remedy delays resulting from fairly conducted
regulatory proceedings.56
Justice Stevens concluded by expressing a fear held by many sup-
porters of governmental land use and environmental regulation. He
noted that proponents of governmental regulation fear that the poten-
tial of damage awards to an aggrieved landowner may cause local offi-
cials to avoid taking necessary regulatory action, even when essential to
the health and safety of the community.57
IV. THE NoLLAN CASE
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission 58 the Court struck down
an easement condition attached to a coastal development permit. The
condition required the landowners to grant an easement permitting
public lateral access to a portion of their beachfront property. Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, focused on the public purpose of the
Id.
52. Id. at 2396.
53. Id. at 2397.
54. Id. at 2399.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979).
56. Id. at 2399.
57. Id. at 2399-2400.
58. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
1988]
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regulation. In an opinion reminiscent of the Court's approach in City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,59 Justice Scalia refused to defer
to the California Coastal Commission's stated purpose for its regula-
tion."° The Commission asserted that constructing a new house, along
with other area development, would cumulatively burden the public's
ability to see, access, and traverse the shorefront.6 1 The majority eval-
uated this purpose under a standard of review that Justice Brennan in
dissent characterized as requiring a degree of exactitude inconsistent
with the Court's standard for reviewing a state's exercise of its police
power.6 2 Justice Scalia concluded that the Coastal Commission's re-
quirements for an easement of lateral access across the Nollan's prop-
erty lacked the "essential nexus" to the Commission's stated
purposes.63 As a result, the Commission's easement requirement was
ccan out-and-out plan of extortion." 64
In the course of his opinion, however, Justice Scalia apparently gave
the imprimatur to a whole host of popular regulatory devices such as
exactions, dedications, impact fees, and linkage fees, as long as the
requisite connection between the regulatory scheme and a permissible
public purpose exists.6 5
59. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
60. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3150. The Court stated:
As indicated earlier, our cases describe the condition for abridgement of property
rights through the police power as a "substantial advanc[ing]" of a legitimate State
interest. We are inclined to be particularly careful about the adjective where the
actual conveyance of property is made in condition to the lifting of a land use
restriction, since in that context there is heightened risk that the purpose is avoid-
ance of the compensation requirement, rather than the stated police power
objective.
Id
61. Id at 3143-44. The Commission stated that the proposed house would "in-
crease blockage of the view of the ocean, thus contributing to the development of 'a
"wall" of residential structures' that would prevent the public 'psychologically... from
realizing a stretch of coastline exists nearby that they have every right to visit,"' and
"would also increase private use of the shorefront." Id
62. Id at 3151. See supra note 60.
63. 107 S. Ct. at 3148. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
64. 107 S. Ct. at 3148.
65. Id at 3147-48. The Court stated:
The Commission argues that a permit condition that serves the same legitimate
police-power purpose as a refusal to issue the permit should not be found to be a
taking if the refusal to issue the permit would not constitute a taking. We agree.
Thus, if the Commission attached to the permit some condition that would have
protected the public's ability to see the beach notwithstanding construction of the
new house-for example, a height limitation, a width restriction, or a ban on
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol34/iss1/6
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Justice Brennan, in dissent, disagreed sharply with Justice Scalia's
insistence on closely examining the means-end relationship of the Com-
mission's action and purpose. Justice Brennan argued that the Com-
mission's regulation was a "reasonable effort to respond to intensified
development along the California coast."66 Arguing that the private
property owners could make no claim that the regulation disrupted
their reasonable expectations, Justice Brennan stated that the Court's
decision gave a windfall to the landowners.67 Clearly, Justice Brennan
believed that a reasonable relationship existed between the Commis-
sion's action and the burdens that the regulation placed on the public
right of access.6
Finally, Justice Brennan argued that the lateral access easement re-
quirement fell short of a taking because the Commission failed to inter-
fere with a pre-existing property interest. The landowners had no
legitimate expectation of a right to completely exclude the public be-
cause the tradition of public access to the coast was guaranteed by the
California Constitution.69 Moreover, the physical intrusion required
by the access easement would be minimal since the affected beach
property was so narrow. In addition, Brennan asserted that the eco-
nomic impact of the easement was negligible. He characterized the
beach access condition as "a classic instance of government action that
fences--so long as the Commission could have exercised its police power (as we
have assumed it could) to forbid construction of the house altogether, imposition of
the condition would also be constitutional.... The evident constitutional propri-
ety disappears, however, if the condition substituted for the prohibition utterly fails
to further the end advanced as the justification for the prohibition.
Id.
66. Id. at 3161-62. Justice Brennan noted:
State agencies... require considerable flexibility in responding to private desires
for development in a way that guarantees the preservation of public access to the
coast. They should be encouraged to regulate development in the context of the
overall balance of competing uses of the shoreline. The Court today does precisely
the opposite, overruling an eminently reasonable exercise of an expert state
agency's judgment, substituting its own narrow view of how this balance should be
struck. Its reasoning is hardly suited to the complex reality of natural resource
protection in the twentieth century.
Id.
67. Id. at 3151.
68. Id at 3154-56. Justice Brennan based his approval of the Commission's actions
on the combined effect of the constantly fluctuating shoreline and increasing coastal
development. Id.
69. CAL. CONST., art. 10, § 4 (Supp. 1987).
1988]
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produces a 'reciprocity of advantages.' "70
In a footnote, Justice Brennan stated that his position was consistent
with First English. Brennan conceded that courts should give states
considerable latitude in regulating private development. But, if a regu-
lation denies a property owner the use and enjoyment of his land so as
to effect a taking, Brennan concluded that compensation is the proper
remedy.7 1
Both Justices Blackmun and Stevens also dissented. Justice Black-
mun argued that creative solutions to land use problems are unattaina-
ble with an "eye for an eye" mentality.72 Agreeing with Justice
Brennan's dissent, Justice Stevens observed, however, that even if
Brennan's position prevailed in this case, there would still be little gui-
dance for land use planners attempting to forecast how the Court will
act in subsequent cases.
V. A FRAMEWORK FOR ACCOMMODATION
The public reaction to the Keystone, First English, and Nollan deci-
sions is worth noting. Sources protective of private property rights
were outraged by Keystone.7 3 First English, on the other hand, was
supported by those with property rights interests and those more sym-
pathetic to the land use regulation perspective.74 Of course, local gov-
ernmental officials were predictably upset with the new uncertainty
First English added to their difficult regulatory tasks.75 Nollan, heard
70. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. at 3158.
71. Id at 3162 n.14.
72. Id at 3162. In this context, the "eye for an eye" phrase denotes that requiring
local governments to pay property owners compensation equal to the loss incurred be-
cause of the taking severely restricts the flexibility the legislature needs for effective land
use regulation.
73. See generally the Wall Street Journal editorial noted in supra note 10.
74. See, eg., N. Y. Times, June 11, 1987, at A26, col. 1 ("A new.., decision wisely
shifts the current balance of law on the ticklish conflict between a landowner's right to
use land freely and government's need to regulate that use in the public interest."); St.
Louis Post Dispatch, June 14, 1987, at 2C, col. 1 ("[it is appropriate that when land
use regulation is tantamount to confiscation, the Constitution's injunction against tak-
ing property without just compensation comes into play.").
75. Henna Ruth Solomon, who filed an amicus brief in First English for the National
Association of Counties, the National League of Cities, and the National Governors'
Association, was "very disappointed" by the decision. Local government officials "will
have to keep in the back of their minds that some court may decide that they made the
wrong choice and that their government will be liable for damages for regulation in the
public interest." N.Y. Times, June 10, 1987, at A26, col. 4.
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on the last day of the Court's 1986-87 term, received less public atten-
tion than did the other cases.76
The public reaction, particularly to First English, in part reflects the
belief that the compensation remedy provides a framework for resolv-
ing an increasingly bitter conflict between private property owners and
state and local governments. The debate between property owners and
local government is a continuing reminder of the frailty of the human
condition. That debate has intensified in the past decade. Meanwhile,
the Supreme Court has abrogated its laissez faire attitude77 regarding
local land use controls while struggling to bring some order to admit-
tedly ad hoc decisions.7 8
Landowners and legislators perceived the "distinct investment-
backed expectations" taking factor that Justice Brennan articulated in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York 79 as a bias in
favor of the private property owner in land use controversies.8" In ad-
dition, the Court tantalized landowners by suggesting that compensa-
tion was a possible remedy for a regulation that deprived property
owners of substantially all use and enjoyment of their land."1 The
Court, however, has approved over the past decade a broad array of
76. It is possible that Justice Powells resignation, announced on the same day as
the Nollan decision, diverted media coverage from the third landmark case.
77. After deciding Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926) and
Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), the Supreme Court did not return to zoning
cases until Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). See generally Brooks,
Zoning Since Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 21 REAL PROP., PROB. & T.J. 409 (1986); Sal-
sich, Group Homes, Shelters and Congregate Housing: Deinstitutionalization Policies
and the NIMBY Syndrome, 21 REAL PROP., PROB. & T.J. 413 (1986).
78. Daniel R. Mandelker, in a recent article, reviews the development of taking law
since the Supreme Court's decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Mandelker concludes that the "distinct investment-backed
expectations" factor that the Court added to taking law in that decision has not had a
significant effect on taking cases. He suggests abandoning the investment-backed expec-
tations factor in favor of continued reliance on the elements that courts traditionally
apply to taking controversies. For example, courts should look at the character of the
governmental action and the effect of that action on private ownership interests, without
applying a "set formula." Mandelker, Investment-Back Expectations: Is There A Tak-
ing? 31 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMp. LAW 3, 6 (1987) [hereinafter cited as
Mandelker].
79. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). For a critical evaluation of Justice Brennan's theory, see
Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government: The Politics
of City Status vs. American Law, 1986 Wis. L. Rav. 83, 136 n.279.
80. See generally Mandelker, supra note 78, at 6.
81. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting; Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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increasingly sophisticated land use and environmental regulations.8 2
The Court's failure to resolve the compensation question8" has resulted
in a growing sense of uncertainty and frustration for both the land use
planning and development communities. 4
The Court has yet to define a regulatory taking and whether to grant
a damages remedy.85 In recent years, however, the Court has clarified
five important points of substantive law:
1) To establish a taking, property owners must show that a
regulation deprived them of all reasonable economic use of their
land.86
2) Because property owners have no right to use their land to
harm others, a regulation that deprives a landowner of all use of
her land to prevent a nuisance is not a taking.87
3) If a government applies a land use regulation to effect a
taking, the fifth amendment requires that the government com-
pensate property owner.88
4) In imposing various creative and flexible land use regula-
tions, legislators must base their application of these techniques to
particular parcels of land on carefully drawn land use plans. The
plans must articulate specific objectives and establish that the reg-
ulatory techniques chosen have a reasonable connection with the
82. See, eg., Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104; Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
83. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. 621; Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County,
477 U.S. 340 (1986).
84. See, eg., Williams, Smith, Siemon, Mandelker and Babcock, The White River
Junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REv. 193 (1984).
85. See generally notes 34-42 and accompanying text. The author has no intention
of diminishing the importance of the difficult problems associated with a compensation
remedy. The author acknowledges the complexity surrounding issues such as the stan-
dard of proof, the measurement of compensation, and the point in the development
process at which delay becomes intolerable. In fact, this Article uses these problems to
buttress the main themes of accommodation and resolution of differences in a less ad-
versarial setting.
86. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text. In determining whether a land-
owner has lost all reasonable economic use of his property, courts must consider use of
the entire parcel of land, rather than merely a "strand of the property bundle." Id.
87. See notes 24-26 and 48 and accompanying text. See also Sax, Takings, Private
Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 155-61 (1971); Michelman, Property,
Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation"
Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1235-37 (1967) (cited in Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. De Benedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1245 n.20 (1987)).
88. See notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
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legislature's objectives."
5) Courts should impose a stricter standard of review when
considering a taking challenge. Rather than simply determining
whether a particular regulation will serve the public interest,
courts must determine whether the regulation substantially ad-
vances legitimate state interests in order for the regulation to sur-
vive a taking challenge.90
It is unclear who the real winners or losers are in these cases. While
interested parties can claim partial victories, the more significant result
may be a renewed effort to establish a more effective process to accom-
modate common interests and resolve differences short of litigation.
A. Restoring a Delicate Balance
If Keystone, First English, and Nollan are considered separately, each
may be said to have influenced the property rights/regulation balance.
Keystone favors property regulators, and First English and Nollan favor
property owners. When read together, however, the cases have actu-
ally restored the land use law equilibrium.
Although land use litigation is often framed as a contest between a
developer"1 and a land use regulator, scholars and practitioners have
recognized a third party in most land use conflicts.92 An owner's pro-
posed use of a particular tract often has an impact on two different
groups of people. Adjacent landowners and residents experience the
physical and aesthetic impacts of the size, shape, and density of the
specific land use. A larger group of people, including residents and
nonresidents of the governmental entity in which the land is located,
may also experience a direct or indirect financial impact in the form of
increased or decreased taxes. The degree of the impact on taxes de-
pends on whether the particular land development increases the need
for public services without a corresponding increase in the tax base, or
whether the project increases the tax base without a corresponding in-
crease in the demand for public services.9 3 It is also possible for this
89. See notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
90. See notes 59-62 and accompanying text. See also Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3147 n.3.
91. The user may be the developer or a user of neighboring land who objects to the
proposed use by the developer.
92. See generally D. MANDELKER AND R. CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND CON-
TROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT 130-134 (1979); Salsich, Displacement and Urban Rein-
vestment: A Mount Laurel Perspective, 53 U. CINN. L. REv. 333, 367 (1984).
93. This phenomenon is referred to as the "tax ratables" of a land development. The
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larger group to experience variations in choice of housing or employ-
ment, depending upon the nature of the particular development.9 a
These groups will also experience the environmental effects of the
development.
These groups and the owner/developer may expect the governmen-
tal entity responsible for regulating land use to represent their best in-
terests when making land use regulatory decisions. When subgroups
emerge both to support and to oppose a land development project, the
land use regulator may find itself caught in the middle of a struggle
over competing values. The resulting relationship resembles a triangle
with the owner/developer on one side, the neighbors on another, and
ratables are said to be positive if tax revenues generated by the project outweigh the cost
of requiring public services, and negative if the reverse is true. See Advisory Comm'n
on Intergovernmental Relations, Fiscal Balance in the Federal System I, 93-101, 265-66
(Oct. 1967), reprinted in D. MANDELKER, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENVIRONMENT
44-47 (2d ed. 1971).
94. Perhaps the most dramatic example of this effect is the public controversy over
exclusionary zoning. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983) (upheld municipal requirement that
land use regulations provide realistic opportunities for low and moderate income hous-
ing); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
336 A.2d 713 (1975), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (a munici-
pality may not use land use regulations to make it physically and economically impossi-
ble to provide low and moderate income housing); Blitz v. Town of New Castle, 94
A.D.2d 92, 463 N.Y.S.2d 832 (App. Div. 1983) (ordinance allowing multifamily hous-
ing construction providing a properly balanced and well-ordered community plan ade-
quately considering regional needs presumptively valid); Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. v.
Incorporated Village of Upper Bronxville, 51 N.Y.2d 338, 414 N.E.2d 680 (N.Y. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042 (1981) (upheld minimum lot requirements of five acres as
valid exercise of village's police power, and bearing a substantial relation to the health,
safety, and welfare of the community); In re Elocin, 501 Pa. 348, 461 A.2d 771 (Pa.
1983) (residential zoning district upheld since municipality had provided for a reason-
able share of multifamily dwellings); Surrick v. Zoning Bd., 382 A.2d 105 (Pa. 1977)
(court used "fair share" test and determined that residential ordinance requiring one-
acre minimum lot sizes unconstitutionally excluded multifamily dwellings); Township
of Williston v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 462 Pa. 445, 341 A.2d 466 (Pa. 1975) (ordi-
nance providing for apartment construction in only 80 of 11,589 acres held unconstitu-
tionally exclusionary); Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (Pa. 1970) (zoning
schemes failure to provide for apartments unconstitutional, even though apartments
were not explicitly prohibited by ordinance); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419
Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (Pa. 1965) (four acre minimum lot requirement held unconstitu-
tional as impermissible means to create a "greenbelt").
See generally Salsich, Displacement and Urban Reinvestment: A Mount Laurel Per-
spective, 53 U. CINN. L. REv. 333, 361-70 (1984); McDougall, The Judicial Struggle
Against Exclusionary Zoning: The New Jersey Paradigm, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
625 (1979); AFTER MOUNT LAUREL: THE NEw SUBURBAN ZONING (J. Rose & R.
Rothman eds. 1977).
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the community at-large on the third.9" All three groups are locked
into this relationship because of the external effects of a land develop-
ment project, which varies with the nature and size of the
development.96
As with other relationships in which competing and common inter-
ests exist, owner/developers, neighbors, and the community at-large
need to support one another for land use relationships to succeed.
Although land does not depreciate in the sense that a building does, it
is a finite resource that can be wasted by unnecessary or harmful devel-
opment. When poorly executed development plans waste land, it may
be lost for the current generation because of the enormous cost and
difficulty of reclaiming such land. Although landowners and develop-
ers make the decisions that produce land waste, they are also members
of the community at-large. As such, they too will benefit from land use
regulations which effectively prevent land waste, and thus the commu-
nity should urge developers to support such regulations.97
Likewise, land use regulators need property users and developers.
With the exception of land set aside in public parks and wilderness
areas, legislators generally aim their regulations at balancing desirable
and undesirable uses of privately owned land to benefit society. If reg-
ulations are so onerous that they discourage even desirable develop-
ment, they do not benefit the community. Thus, the reaction of
95. While the triangle is a useful symbol of typical land use relationships, it is not
totally accurate because the owner/developer will also be a member of the community
at-large and may, under certain circumstances, be a member of the neighborhood. For
example, when a resident-owner of adjacent property develops a vacant lot, he covers all
three sides of the land use triangle.
96. Although size is an important indicator of the likely external effects of land
development, it is certainly not the only one. Some of the most emotional land use
conflicts in recent years have involved buildings of relatively small size. See, eg., City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (group homes for the men-
tally retarded); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1984) (unmarried college
students sharing single-family residence).
97. Of course, the regulations must be effective in preventing land waste. For an
eloquent warning against uncritical reliance on preservation techniques such as transfer
of development rights (TDR), see Richards, Downtown Growth Control Through Devel-
opment Rights Transfer, 21 REAL PROP., PROB. & T.J. 435, 474-83 (1986).
In addition, the argument might be made that landowners would benefit more from
an open market in land if they use their land wisely and do not waste it because their
better-used land would presumably be scarcer and thus more valuable. Even so, effec-
tive land use regulations that prevent land waste will increase the overall value of the
total available land in the community and thus benefit the owners of that land.
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developers to land regulation provides important feedback to legisla-
tors concerning the utility of their regulations.
The availability of compensation as a remedy in taking cases is a
significant addition to land use law. The compensation remedy sup-
ports those traditional arguments that accepted no difference in princi-
ple between "takings by dispossession" and "takings by excessive
regulation."98  In addition, compensation can serve as a necessary
check on government and as a means of retaining (or perhaps restor-
ing) the consent of the people in their governments.9 9 Finally, compen-
sation can be viewed as the price for public willingness to accept the
"innovative," "flexible," and "comprehensive" land use regulations
that today's legislators believe necessary. 1°0
The American system of property law, with its emphasis on private
ownership of land, has two basic goals: to maximize and protect indi-
vidual freedoms and to effectively utilize land. To achieve these goals,
the chief actors in the American property law system-landowners, de-
velopers, users, neighbors, and regulators-must respect one another's
interests. Additionally, state and local governments must provide the
community with appropriate vehicles for asserting these competing in-
terests. Ideally, these interests should exist in equilibrium. If one is
perceived to have an unfair advantage, the cooperation necessary for
the system's functioning breaks down.1 The cumulative effect of the
cases decided during the 1986-87 term should prevent such break-
downs. Compensation is now available for regulatory takings, even if
temporary. The likelihood, however, that a court would find a care-
fully drawn and carefully tailored regulation to be a taking has dimin-
98. See, e.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, at 638
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
99. See generally Freilich, Solving the Taking Equation: Making the Whole Equal
the Sum of the Parts, 15 URB. L. 447, 479-83 (1983) (approving damages rather than
compensation for tortious interference with property rights).
100. See, eg., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Ange-
les County, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2399 n.17 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Nollan v. Califor-
nia Coastal Comm., 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3161-62 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
101. Morton P. Fisher, Jr., of Baltimore, Md. forcefully stated the case for coopera.
tion at a recent conference of real estate lawyers: "Every lawyer representing a devel-
oper has a silent client-the city. You must take time to understand it. A city has been
described as an oversized marshmallow. You can knead it, punch it, roll it, shake it; but
if you heat it up, it becomes very sticky." Address by Morton P. Fisher, Jr., American
College of Real Estate Lawyers, Land: Its Use, Abuse, Non-Use and Re-Use, Balti-
more, Maryland (October 20, 1986).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol34/iss1/6
KEYSTONE, FIRST ENGLISH AND NOLLAN
ished considerably. °2
B. An Accommodation Process 10 3
The First English decision clearly outlines a new phase of land use
regulation. It would be unfortunate if the only persons who benefit
from it are the lawyers and experts retained to argue the fine points of
regulatory takings and compensation. The costs and uncertainties of
the First English approach are so great that reason suggests that both
land users and regulators seek an alternative to this new phase.
A possible alternative to Justice Stevens' feared "litigation explo-
sion" "° would be to establish a mechanism to identify potential regula-
tory takings as early as possible. The purposes of the mechanism 31°
would be to allow aggrieved landowners to raise regulatory taking
challenges sooner rather than later, and to give the regulatory body a
vehicle for responding to and resolving any resulting disputes.
Early review systems are currently available in a number of other
land use control contexts. For example, the Pennsylvania eminent do-
main statute authorizes a landowner whose property is subject to emi-
nent domain proceedings to obtain an early hearing from the local
board. Under the statute, local boards can award just compensation on
the ground that the delay in prosecuting the eminent domain action
itself amounts to a taking." 6 Additionally, the Supreme Court's reluc-
tance to review the merits of taking cases until the aggrieved land-
owner has exhausted all local and state appeal procedures' °7 highlights
the importance of statutory provisions that authorize landowners to
bring inverse condemnation actions when there is an excessive delay in
102. See notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
103. The concept of an accommodation process to resolve land use disputes through
techniques such as transferable development rights was stated eloquently in Berger, The
Accommodation Power in Land Use Controversies: A Reply to Professor Costonis, 76
COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1976).
104. First English Evangelical Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S.
Ct. 2378, at 2400 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
105. Such a mechanism could be created by state statute as a local administrative
review board, or established by local ordinance as a taking review process within the
established land use regulation system.
106. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 26, § 1-502(e) (Purdon 1981).
107. See, e.g., Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton
Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194-97 (1985); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 108 S. Ct. 849, 856-57
(1988); Shelter Creek Dev. Corp. v. City of Oxnard, 838 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1988).
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the prosecution of an eminent domain action. 108
The concern over delay is equally important in the land use regula-
tion context. Developers have a relatively brief "window of opportu-
nity" for particular projects."0 9 Instability of interest rates, costs of
construction, and the expense of maintaining non-income-producing
land can increase the cost of a project beyond the developer's financial
ability. 110
Regulatory takings raise an additional question that is inapplicable
in the eminent domain context: Does delay caused by the regulatory
process effects a taking in a situation in which the government has no
plans to acquire a property interest? In the eminent domain setting,
the government decides to acquire a property interest. The land-
owner's concern in a delayed eminent domain proceeding is whether
the government will pay just compensation if market values drop dur-
ing the delay period.111
Resolution of this regulatory taking question requires sophisticated
analysis of the relationship between regulatory delay, reasonable expec-
tations of landowners, including investment-backed expectations, and
the possible uses for the land during the delay period. This analysis
may be carried out in the local regulatory process as well as in the
courthouse. Although the Supreme Court has yet to decide whether
delay alone can amount to a taking, the emphasis in Keystone, First
English, and Nollan on deprivation of all reasonable economic use of
property suggests a negative answer. While the delay may prevent the
owner from using the land as she desires, it is unlikely to deprive her of
all economic use of the land. Therefore, some prohibition of use, in
addition to a delay, would be necessary for a court to find a taking.
108. See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1245.260 (1982); Cassettari v. County of
Nevada, Cal., 824 F.2d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 1987).
109. Address by Assistant Professor Alan Weinberger, Saint Louis University
School of Law (August 24, 1987).
110. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2399 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, a developer's
"window of opportunity" can rapidly close as a result of inordinate delays in the con-
struction process, whether those delays are caused by acts of God or "improperly moti-
vated, unfairly conducted, or unnecessarily protracted governmental decisionmaking."
Id
111. "Condemnation blight" cases raise this issue and courts which accept the argu-
ment that governmental delay has artificially depressed property values usually back-
date the assessment of just compensation on the date at which the delay became exces-
sive. See Lange v. State, 86 Wash. 2d 585, 547 P.2d 282 (1976). See generally Salsich,
Displacement and Urban Reinvestment: A Mount Laurel Perspective, 53 U. CINN. L.
REv. 333, 359 n.115 (1984).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol34/iss1/6
KEYSTONE, FIRST ENGLISH AND NOLLAN
Landmarks preservation programs currently use an administrative
review process to evaluate the economic impact of the regulation on
property owners.' 12 For example, the Seattle Landmarks Preservation
Ordinance requires the administering board to seek an agreement with
the owner of a designated landmark on an appropriate range of "con-
trols and incentives" to preserve property. 13 If the parties are unable
to reach an agreement within a designated time, the board prepares
recommended controls and incentives and forwards them to a hearing
examiner who conducts a public hearing on the matter.'14 Following
the hearing, the hearing examiner may submit recommendations to the
Seattle City Council, which has authority to enact ordinances estab-
lishing specific controls and economic incentives with respect to desig-
nated landmarks. 15
An important limitation on the Seattle landmarks regulatory process
is that no regulation may deprive landowners of "a reasonable eco-
nomic return."'1 6 In determining the reasonable return on a site, the
ordinance limits consideration to five factors: 1) the market value of
the site before and after the imposition of controls or incentives; 2) the
owner's yearly net return on the site for the previous five years; 3) esti-
mates of future net returns on the site, with and without the controls or
incentives in question; 4) the net return and the rate of return necessary
to attract capital for investment on the site after the imposition of con-
trols, if available, or on a comparable site with comparable controls;
and 5) the net return and rate of return realized on comparable sites
with comparable controls." 7
A final area in which local governments employ early-warning ad-
ministrative review procedures is rent control. The rent control ordi-
nance recently upheld by the Supreme Court in Pennell v. City of San
Jose I establishes an advisory commission on rents and rental disputes
112. See, e.g., SEATrLE, WA., CODE, § 25.12.010 (1977).
113. SEATrLE, WA., CODE, § 25.12.490 (1977). For a superb analysis of the use of
negotiated agreements as a basis for land use regulation, see Wegner, Moving Toward
the Bargaining Table" Contract Zoning, Development Agreements, and the Theoretical
Foundations of Government Land Use Deals, 65 N.C. L. REv. 957 (1987).
114. SEATTLE, WA., CODE, §§ 25.12.520 to 25.12.560.
115. Id. at § 25.12.610.
116. Id at § 25.12.580.
117. Id. at § 25.12.590.
118. 107 S. Ct. 1346 (1987).
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and a hearing officer to mediate rental increase disputes. 1 9 The San
Jose ordinance allows rent increases of up to eight percent per year.120
Unless a tenant has appealed to the hearing officer, increases in excess
of eight percent may go into effect automatically after landlords have
given notice of the increase to the affected tenants. Tenants who wish
to appeal must file a timely petition for a hearing. 121 The hearing of-
ficer is to conduct a hearing and determine within ten days whether, in
light of all the evidence presented, the proposed rent increase is
reasonable. 122
If the hearing officer determines that any part of the proposed in-
crease is unreasonable, a thirty-day mediation process commences in
which the landlord and tenants seek an appropriate rental increase. If
the parties fail to reach an agreement, the hearing officer determines
and grants a reasonable increase. 123 Each party has seven days to ap-
peal the hearing officer's decision to an arbitrator. The arbitrator con-
ducts a hearing and reviews the report of the hearing officer and any
additional documentation the parties supply within ten days after the
hearing. Within seventeen days of the appeal hearing, the arbitrator
makes a final determination of the allowable rental increase, supported
by written findings of fact. 24 The entire process is set up to permit
landlords a fair and reasonable return on the value of their property
while protecting tenants from arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable
rent increases.1
25
An early-warning administrative review process would give land-
owners an opportunity to voice their concerns about the effects that
land use regulations may have on their property rights. 126 The early
119. SAN JOSE, CALIF., MUN. CODE, §§ 5702.3, 5702.7, 5705.1-5705.7, 2249.100-
2249.101 (1979).
120. Id at § 5703.2. The statute states that increases exceeding eight percent shall
be subject to review.
121. Id at §§ 5703.6, 5703.12 and 5703.27.
122. Id. at § 5703.17. Generally, the landlord has the burden of proving the reason-
ableness of a particular rent increase. In determining reasonableness, the hearing officer
must consider a number of factors relating to costs of capital improvements, mainte-
nance and operation, rehabilitation, debt service, rental condition of the premises, in-
creases or decreases in services, and "the economic and financial hardship imposed on
the ... tenants." Id at §§ 5703.28 and 5703.29. (The tenant hardship provision was
the subject-of the Pennell case).
123. Id at § 5703.20.
124. Id at §§ 5703.22 to 5703.25.
125. Id at § 5703.28.
126. In the context of land use regulation, the Supreme Court defines "property
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review process would alert the responsible authorities before the partic-
ular regulation actually effects a taking. Early review would also en-
courage affected parties to identify and accommodate common
interests through compromise following negotiation or mediation.127
Finally, early review would give the municipality a greater role in
framing the issues for judicial review since the aggrieved party would
base his appeal on the record developed at the local arbitration hearing.
Rather than creating another layer of review that might contribute
to the existing delays, state and local governments could incorporate
the early review process into the basic land use regulatory system. The
following essential elements of the early review process may already be
in place, or local governments could add them to most land use regula-
tory systems with little difficulty.
1. Expertise in Land Economics and Land Use Law
The factual findings required to determine whether a particular regu-
lation effects a taking necessitate a sophisticated analysis of highly
technical data. Much of the data is prospective in nature, such as mar-
ket trends and cost projections. The compensation remedy requires
municipalities to incorporate the ability to make those determinations
in their existing process of developing and evaluating land use
regulations.
Justice Scalia's requirement in Nollan of a substantial nexus between
regulations and specific public purposes together with his willingness to
submit land use regulations to a heightened standard of review12 re-
right" as the owner's right to make "economically viable use" of his land. Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De Benedictis, 107 S. Ct. at 1242 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), and citing Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, may have contrib-
uted to the uncertainty about that definition of property rights by using the denial of
"all use" rather than "economically viable use" in First English as his standard for
determining whether a fifth amendment taking has occurred. First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2384, 2385,
2388, 2389 (1987).
127. For an excellent review of creative approaches to resolving land use conflicts,
see G. BINGHAM, RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL DisPuTEs: A DECADE OF EXPERI-
ENCE (1986).
128. Although the legitimacy of a regulation's purpose may well be a "question of
federal, rather than state, law, subject to independent scrutiny by... [the Supreme]
Court," Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De Benedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1256 (1987)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting), the crucial inquiry, whether a regulation deprives the
owner of all reasonable economic use of his land, is basically a factual question to be
determined at the administrative level.
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veal another area of land use regulation that is highly technical. This
area is the development and articulation of the requisite connection
between a particular regulation and the purpose for which the govern-
ment is considering it.
Both the taking determination and Justice Scalia's nexus require-
ment should be made before the government applies a regulation to a
particular property interest.' 29 The three landmark cases illustrate
that municipalities that retain the traditional, "nonprofessional citi-
zen" format for land use regulation and that engage in land use regula-
tion without the technical capability to make taking and nexus
determinations do so at the peril of the taxpayers' pocketbooks. The
technical review of a challenged regulation's actual effects on a particu-
lar tract of land should be conducted by either a hearing examiner with
land use expertise or by a technical panel composed of specialists who
would present their findings to a hearing examiner.
The technical review would not be designed to produce a legal deci-
sion concerning whether a taking has occurred. Rather, the review's
purpose would be to identify those situations in which an unlawful tak-
ing is likely to occur.13 The technical review would focus on the
requisite nexus for the application of the regulation and on the eco-
nomic effect of the regulation on the property.
An example of the use of technical experts and public hearings to
establish a requisite nexus for an impact fee regulation is the San Fran-
cisco Transit Impact Development Fee Ordinance, upheld in Russ
Building Partnership v. City &'County of San Francisco.3' By requir-
ing developers of downtown commercial property to pay a transit fee of
up to five dollars per square foot of office space, the legislators intended
to offset anticipated costs of getting new riders to and from the new
buildings. In approving the ordinance, the court noted that the city
performed numerous studies and held public hearings to determine the
reasonable cost of the increased transit services.' 32 With this in mind,
the city hired consultants to project the long-term needs and costs of
transit services.
13 3
129. See notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
130. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in First English that governments retain the flex-
ibility either to pay compensation for a taking or to modify the regulation to prevent a
taking from occurring. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389.
131. 234 Cal. Rptr. I (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
132. Id. at 6.
133. I&
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2. Consultation Between Landowner and Regulatory Staff
Planning is an "endeavor that requires a search for consensus."'134
The earlier in the process that the search begins in earnest, the less
likelihood there is of destructive controversy. The remedy of compen-
sation provides an incentive that should enhance that search, thereby
encouraging consensus. One means of obtaining consensus is to talk to
the property owner whose land is threatened. For example, the Seattle
Landmarks Preservation Ordinance 135 permits the owner of property
designated as a landmark to initiate a consultation process with the
Landmarks Preservation Board and staff. The parties meet with the
purpose of reaching agreement on specific elements of a building to be
preserved and the methods of preservation.136 State and local govern-
ments could implement a similar process to trigger a "taking review"
and search for accommodation that would help eliminate the taking
issue. 37 In addition, this process could allow the government to con-
front the taking question and to compensate the owner through a "zon-
ing with compensation" technique.' 38
At the present time, informal consultation is often unsuccessful be-
cause the typical land use regulatory process is adversarial in nature.
As such, ex parte contacts may raise suspicion among the interested
parties. A built-in consultation process would encourage ex parte con-
tacts. Therefore, care would have to be taken to insure that the public
interest is protected, possibly by requiring any agreements developed
by such consultation to be subject to public review through a public
hearing and a ratification vote by the decision-making body.' 39
134. Professor Julian H. Levi, Hastings College of Law, Statement at Annual Meet-
ing Program of the ABA Section of Urban, State and Local Government Law, San
Francisco, California (August 10, 1987).
135. See supra notes 110-22 and accompanying text.
136. SEATrLE, WA., CODE, § 25.12.460 (1977).
137. Legislation authorizing development agreements is one possible approach to
accommodating the interests. See generally Wegner, supra note 113, at 1008-27.
138. "Zoning with compensation" is not a new idea, but it has not been used very
often because of the Supreme Court's acceptance of noncompensatory zoning in Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). When courts find both a proper
public purpose and a substantial relationship to public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare of the community, courts will approve government action as a "joint exercise of
the power of eminent domain and the police power." City of Kansas City v. Kindle,
446 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Mo. 1969).
139. Professor Wegner discusses in considerable detail the problem of protecting the
public interest in the context of contingent zoning and development agreements. See
Wegner, supra note 113, at 986-94, 1008-27.
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3. Standards for Triggering the Early Review
Because the early review process could contribute to delay, it should
only be available to those with an economic stake in the land in ques-
tion. Thus, neighbors opposing a proposed use should have access to
the early review process only if the proposed land use would so injure
their use of neighboring property as to effect a taking of property.
Generalized expressions of concern about decline in property values, so
typical of land use conflict today, should be insufficient to confer stand-
ing to trigger early review. A municipality, however, should not ignore
potential depreciation when a large number of landowners express such
a concern stemming from limitations on the use of their property that
could result from the proposal under review.
A landowner or developer with a legally enforceable means of gain-
ing control of the property, such as an option to purchase, should be
able to trigger the process by a written communication to the regula-
tory body. Such notification should state that application of the chal-
lenged regulation would deny the owner "economically viable use" of
the land.
4. Identification of Techniques that Could Necessitate Early
Review
There are three obvious candidates for early review: first, when a
local government imposes additional regulations as conditions for re-
ceiving a permit when a landowner has already met the objective stan-
dards governing the issuance of permits; second, when there is a
substantial delay in governmental decisionmaking with respect to an
application for a permit, or in the assessment of impact fees, exactions,
or linkage charges; and finally, early review would be warranted in the
case of regulation of privately owned land in anticipation of future pub-
lic development.
The nexus requirement of Nollan,"4 however, raises questions about
the validity of a wide range of traditional forms of land use control that
may have been imposed without regard to a specific nexus. Thus, it is
impossible and undesirable to delineate precisely the types of regula-
tions that should trigger early review. The Supreme Court of New
Hampshire suggested a useful standard for evaluating whether early
review ought to be available: the greater the cost of accomplishing
something which is considered to be in the public interest, the greater
140. See generally notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
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the reason why a single individual should not be required to bear that
burden. 141
5. Burden of Proof
The landowner should bear the burden of establishing that the effect
of the disputed regulation will constitute a taking. The Seattle
Landmarks Preservation Ordinance suggests several factors that could
be useful in determining whether a regulation denies an owner econom-
ically viable use of land: a) market value before and after application
of the regulation; b) yearly net return on the site; c) estimated future
yearly net return with and without the regulation; d) net return and
rate of return necessary to attract capital for investment; and e) net
return and rate of return on comparable sites not subject to the dis-
puted regulation. 1
42
6. Public Hearing and Appeals
A separate public hearing is unnecessary unless the taking question
arises at a point in the regulatory process that precludes the presenta-
tion of the complaint before the planning or governing body. The hear-
ing on the taking question should proceed in an adjudicative manner.
If the taking question is raised as part of the regular legislative hearing,
the legislature should appoint a hearing examiner to conduct that por-
tion of the hearing. Aggrieved parties would base their appeals on the
record developed at the administrative level. This formal judicial-type
hearing is warranted because the questions raised by an as applied tak-
ing challenge normally involve technical questions of fact and law,
rather than competing values that require legislative policy
decisions. 143
State and local governments should establish an administrative land
use review process that incorporates techniques of negotiation and me-
diation along with professional planning expertise. Implementation of
such a review process at the front end of the land use regulatory system
would enable governments to identify the substantive limits of land use
141. Burrows v. City of Keene, 432 A.2d 15 (N.H. 1981), (citing Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)); Monongahela Navigat'n Co. v. United States,
148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893).
142. SEATrLE, WA., CODE, § 25.12.590 (1977).
143. See, eg., the hearing procedures established for landmarks preservation dis-
putes in Seattle, supra notes 113-117 and accompanying text; the rent control process in
San Jose, supra notes 119-125 and accompanying text.
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regulation. Thus, governments can prevent taking challenges arising
from the lack of a nexus or from the denial of all reasonable economic
use through accommodation or through payment of compensation.
Under this proposed early review system, landowners and developers
would have a heavy burden of proof on the taking question. At the
same time, however, these parties would gain important access to a
reviewing authority relatively early in the regulatory process. Thus,
cities would have a method both for guarding against regulatory ex-
cesses and for keeping the compensation "tiger" manageable. As a re-
sult, land use planners could take "reasonable" chances, and
landowners could obtain redress if the fallout from those chances
proves harmful.
VI. CONCLUSION
Effective use of an early review system, along with regulations care-
fully tailored to specific land use policies, would enable municipalities
to continue to plan and regulate land in comprehensive, flexible, and
innovative ways. Keystone established that a challenged regulation
must deprive the owner of all economic use of his land, not just the
economic use of a "strand of the property bundle." First English rec-
ognized that compensation is a proper remedy when a Keystone taking
occurs. Although Nollan imposes a stricter standard of review and a
means-end relationship, the Court also approved a wide range of regu-
latory techniques in which the regulators can establish the requisite
means-end relationship. As a result, landowners have access to the
compensation remedy, but continue to have an extremely difficult time
proving a taking. Cities that fear the compensation remedy can pre-
vent a taking by implementing an early review system.
Other approaches that governments may consider include: statutory
limitations on the amount of compensation that landowners may re-
cover; the granting of immunity to planning and regulatory officials for
decisions made in their official capacities; shortened statutes of limita-
tions for compensation claims; and finally, the use of mediation tech-
niques to settle disputes before the compensation issue arises. These
alternative approaches, however, are merely suggestions for future de-
velopments in the land use regulatory process. For now, the best re-
sponse to the Supreme Court's taking trilogy is the use of an early
review process coupled with carefully tailored land use regulations.
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